Directory:Logic Museum/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Summa Logicae I 1-7 - Revision history

Ockham at 20:55, 11 March 2010

2010-03-11T20:55:29Z

2010-03-11T20:51:22Z

2010-03-11T20:46:51Z

2010-02-14T17:11:55Z

2010-02-14T17:05:43Z

2010-02-14T17:04:37Z

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-||            [Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI]
+||   <div id="SLI-1"> [Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI]
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-|| '''CAP. 2. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI, ET QUOD DIVERSIMODE POTEST ACCIPI HOC NOMEN 'TERMINUS' IN SPECIALI'''
+|| <div id="SLI-2">'''CAP. 2. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI, ET QUOD DIVERSIMODE POTEST ACCIPI HOC NOMEN 'TERMINUS' IN SPECIALI'''
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-||            (xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est
+||            (xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale.
 ||In another way, a sign is understood for that which makes something come into cognition and is suited to supposit for it, or to be added to such a thing in the proposition, of which sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, such as an expression.  And understanding the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is not the natural sign of anything.
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 ||            (xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est
 signum naturale.
-||            In another way, a sign is taken for that which makes something come into cognition and is suited to supposit for it, or to be added to such a thing in the proposition, of which sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, such as an expression.  Taking the word ‘sign’ in this way, an utterance is a natural sign of nothing.
+||In another way, a sign is understood for that which makes something come into cognition and is suited to supposit for it, or to be added to such a thing in the proposition, of which sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, such as an expression.  And understanding the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is not the natural sign of anything.
 |}
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-||'''Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI'''
+||            [Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI]
-|| Part I, chapter 1.  Of the definition of the term and of its division in general
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-|| (i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse".
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← Older revision		Revision as of 17:05, 14 February 2010
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−	x	+	{\| border=1 cellpadding=10
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		+	\|\|'''Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI'''
		+	\|\| Part I, chapter 1. Of the definition of the term and of its division in general
		+	\|- valign = top
		+
		+	\|\| (i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse".
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		+	\|\| All those who treat logic try to show that arguments are put together out of propositions and propositions out of terms. Thus a term is nothing else but a proximate part of a proposition. For, defining a term in ''[[Prior Analytics]]'' I, [[Aristotle]] says "I call a term [that] into which a proposition is resolved, i.e. the predicate and that of which it is predicated, either by what is conjoined or disjoined, [expressing] what is the case or is not.
		+	\|}
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		+	[[Category:Logic Museum Parallel Texts]]